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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SCC'n 1. THEURER, D.M.C.,
Emclever No. 1-082690-1,

*

Petitioner,

ADDENDUM
*

vs.
*
BOA_-L Cr REVIEW,
INE'VSIRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,*
Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 20903

*
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"endings and Conclusions
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7-ah Code Annotated, Section
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Zcr.rinental Telephone Company of Utah v. State Tax Commission
tf Utah, 539 P.2d 447 (1975)
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"C"inental Oil Company of Utah v. Board of Review of the
I.-.dustrial Commission of Utah, 568 P.2d 727 (Utah, 1977)

6.

rLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, p 41 (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968)
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DEC 191985
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

Tabl

BOARD OF REVIEW
The Industrial Commission of U«,ah
Unemployment Compensation Appeals

LLN/KM/KAZ/mgn

SCOn L. THEURER, DMC
Employer No. 1-082690-1

Case No. 85-A-2231
vs.

DECISION
Case No. 85-BR-411

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

After careful consideration of the record and testimony 1n the
above-entitled matter, the Board of Review finds the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge to be fair and unbiased and supported by competent evidence and, therefore, affirms such decision holding Dr. Scott L.
Theurer, DMD, as a successor to Dr. Steve S. Larson pursuant to $35-4~7{c)
(1)(C) of the Utah Employment Security Act. In so holding, the Board of
Review hereby adopts the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge.
J

This decision will become final ten days after the date of mailing hereof, and any further appeal must be made directly with the Utah
Supreme Court at the State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, within
ten days after this decision becomes final. To file an appeal with the
Supreme Court, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for
Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35-4-10(1)
of the Utah Employment Security Act, followed by a Docketing Statement and
a Legal Brief.

.BOARD OF REV

Dated this 5th day of September, 1985.
Date Mailed:

September 10, 1985.

nm^
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,rE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAh
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
Appeals Section
Decision of Administrative Law Judge

Scott L. Theurer, DMD
150 East 200 North
Logan, Utah 84321
APPEAL FILED:

APPEARANCES:

March 20, 1985

Employer

Employer No.
Case No.
DATE OF HEARING:

PLACE OF HEARING:

J82690-1
84-A-2231

May 22, 1985
Logan, Utah

The decision review representative's decision issued on March 11, 1985 held
Dr. Scott Theurer as successor to Dr. Steven Larson.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Scott L. Theurer, DMD began a dentistry practice in Logan on or about July 1,
1984. Dr. Theurer acquired assets for his business from Dr. Steven S. Larson.
Dr. Larson discontinued his practice in Logan and moved out of state. Dr.Theurer purchased dental equipment from Dr. Larson for the amount $52,750.
Dr. Larson retained various hand tools, casting machine, etc valued by Dr.Theurer to be approximately $4,000. Dr. Larson also retained his accounts
receivable valued by Dr. Theurer at approximately $41,206. Dr. Theurer contracted with Dr. Larson to lease the premises which Dr. Larson previously
occupied for his practice. Dr. Larson owns the premises. The value of this
premises is estimated as $66,000. Dr. Theurer also made a lease agreement with
Dr. Larson to lease the Lewiston office and equipment valued at $10,000. At the
time of transition between Dr. Larson and Dr. Theurer1s practice, Dr. Theurer
estimated Dr. Larson's assets at $173,956. Dr. Theurer paid Dr. Larson a total
of $55,000. The purchase price represents 30% of the value of the assets owned
and operated by Dr. Larson in his practice.
The total purchase price included dental equipment and a letter of introduction. The letter of introduction informed Dr. Larson's patients that Dr. Larson
was leaving the area and recommended Dr. Theurer to continue with providing their
dental care.
The purchase agreement between the two doctors also contained a restrictive
covenant that Dr. Larson would not practice general dentistry within twenty-five
miles for period of five years. When Dr. Theurer acquired Dr. Larson's practice
there were approximately 1300 active patients of record. Dr. Theurer estimated
approximately 100 patients left in preference of a different dentist. Approximately seven to nine hundred have retained Dr. Theurer's services and 200 are of
unknown status. Dr. Theurer obtained approximately 300 additional new patients.

Dr. Scott L. Theurer, DMD

-2-

1-082690-1

REASONING AND CONCLUSION
Section 35-4-7(c)(l)(C) of the Utah Employment Security Act states that if an
employer has acquired all or substantially all of the assets of another employer
and the other employer had discontinued operations upon the acquisition,. . . the
benefit costs of both employers and the payrolls of both employers during the
qualifying period shall be jointly considered for the purpose of determining and
establishing the acquiring parties qualifications for experience rating classification.
Dr. Theurer argues he shouldn't be considered as an accessor employer because he
only purchased 30% of Dr. Larson's assets. The language in the act does not
state purchase. The word "acquired" is used. Acquired is different from
purchase. To acquire means obtain something by any means. The acquire would
include purchasing, but isn't restricted to such. To acquire all or substantially all assets encompasses any lawful means of obtaining the assets. This would
include purchasing, leasing, inheriting, etc.
A preponderance of the evidence shows Dr. Theurer purchasing or leasing the
majority of the assets of Dr. Larson's dental practice. Dr. Theurer acquired the
majority of Dr. Larson's assets for the continuation of the dental practice.
Dr. Theurer acquired approximately 75% of Dr. Larson's practice by either
purchase or lease agreement; the majority of assets needed for the continuation
of a dental practice. Dr. Theurer succeeding Dr. Larson is further evident by
the buying and issuance of a letter of recommendation which allowed Dr. Theurer
to retain the majority of Dr. Larson's patients. Had Dr. Theurer started his
practice without Dr. Larson's clientele he would have obtained only approximately
300 patients, which is only a fraction of the clientele he inherited with the
acquisition of Dr. Larson's dental practice. The complete acquisition of
Dr. Larson's dental practice is further demonstrated by the restrictive clause
prohibiting Dr. Larson from practicing within a twenty-five mile radius for five
years. Dr. Theurer acquired substantially all the assets of Dr. Larson's dental
practice. As such, the benefit costs and payrolls from Dr. Larson's practice
should be used in determining Dr. Theurer's contribution experience rate.
DECISION
The decision review representative's decision dated March 11, 1985 holding
Dr. Theurer as a successor to Dr. Larson pursuant to Section 35-4-7(c)(l)(C) of
the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed.

Kenneth yc. M a j o r > ^
Administrative Law 3uage
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

^

This decision will become final unless with ten days from
June 19, 1985,
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (P. 0. Box 11600, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84147) setting forth grounds upon which the appeal is made.
ji
cc: Kevin E. Kane, Daines 4 Kane

Tab 3

the computation date on or after January 1,1985. A qualified employer who
after March 31 pays all required contributions shall, for the current
contribution year, be assigned a rate based upon his own experience as
provided under the experience rating provisions of this act effective the first
day of the calendar quarter in which the payment was made. Delinquency in
filing contribution reports shall not be the basis for denial of a rate less than
the^xirrx^ c ^ n t r i h u ^ ^ e , ^
^
as ^
(in pertirient
p £ r
If an employer has acquired all or substantially all the assets of another
employer and the other employer had discontinued operations upon the
acquisition, the period of liability with respect to the filing of contribution
reports, the payment of contributions, after January 1, 1985, the benefit
costs of both employers, and the payrolls of both employers during the
qualifying period shall be jointly considered for the purpose of determining
and establishing the acquiring party's qualifications for an experience rating
classification. The transferring employer shall be divested of his payroll
experience.
When an employer or prospective employer has acquired an operating
department, section, division, or any substantial portion of the business or
assets of any employer which is clearly segregable and identifiable, the entire
payroll experience, and benefit costs after January 1, 1985, of the
transferring employer shall be divided between the transferring and
acquiring employers in proportion to the payroll for the four preceding
completed calendar quarters attributable to the operating assets conveyed
and retained. The rate of the acquiring employer for the current contribution year shall be that rate which is assigned under regulations of the
commission.
Any employing unit or prospective employing unit which acquires all or
part of the payroll experience of an employer shall, for all purposes of this
act, be an employer as of the date of acquisition.
When an employer, as provided in this subsection, has been divested of
his payroll experience by transferring all of his business to another and by
ceasing operations as of the date of the transfer, the transferring employer
shall, notwithstanding section 35-4-8, cease to be an employer, as defined by
this act, as of the date of transfer.
(D) "Reserve" means that amount of money in the fund exclusive of
moneys transferred to the fund under the Federal Employment Security
Administrative Financing Act of 1954, which have been appropriated or are
subject to appropriation by the state legislature.
(E) "Total wages" means all remuneration paid by an employer to
employees for insured work.
(F) "Contribution year" means any calendar year beginning on
January 1 and ending on December 31.

23
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CONTINENTAL TELEPHONE CO. OP UTAH 7. STATE TAX COM'N

CONTINENTAL TELEPHONE COMPANY
OF UTAH, Plaintiff,
v.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Defendant.
Nos. 13842, 13843.

Supremo Court of Utah.
Aiur. 13, 1073

Local tel
one companies, which
were subsidiarity of nationwide telephone
corporation, sought reversal of Tax Commission's decision partially disallowing
claimed deductions for federal transfer
payments made to parent corporation. The
Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that under statutes which provide for allocation of
income and deductions between several
corporations controlled by same interests
and which permit deduction for taxes paid,
local telephone companies could only deduct from state income proportionate share
of federal taxes actually paid by parent
nonresident corporation, which in computing total federal taxes due could deduct
losses of subsidiary corporations, and not
amount of federal transfer payments forwarded by subsidiary to parent.
Affirmed.
Henriod, C. J., concurred in result.
1. Statutes C=>245
While general rule as to taxing statutes is that they are construed strictly
against taxing authority and favorably to
taxpayer, the reverse is true as to provisions allowing deductions.

Utah
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• »i the conditions and necessities which
ihey aie intended tu meet and objects
sought to be obtained therebv.
A. Taxation O I 0 0 5 , 1031
Statute providing for allocation of income and deduction between several corporations controlled by same interests authorizes the Tax Commission to so apportion
income and deductions of corporations
within controlled groups as to fairly and
equitably reflect income earned in Utah.
U.C.A.1953, 59-13-17.
5. Taxation C=^I046
Statutes which provide for allocation
of income and deductions between several
corporations controlled by same interests
and which permit deduction for taxes paid,
do not contemplate that federal transfer
payments made by resident corporation to
nonresident parent corporation be considered as proper deductions from state income unless such payments are actually
paid to federal government. U.C.A.1953,
59-13-7, 59-13-17.
6. Taxation <§=>I046
Under statutes which provide for allocation of income and deductions between
several corporations controlled by same interests and which permit deduction from
state income of taxes paid, local telephone
companies could only deduct proportionate
share of federal taxes actually paid by parent nonresident corporation, which in computing total taxes due could deduct losses
of subsidiary corporations, and not amount
of federal transfer payments forwarded by
local companies to parent, from state income. U.C.A.1953, 59-13-7, 59-13-17.

2. Statutes 0 2 4 5
In accordance with rule that deductions are allowed as matter of grace and
therefore should be strictly construed, taxpayer claiming deduction is required to
show that his claim is fairly and clearly allowable under relevant statute.

Merrill R. Weech, John W. Horsley, of
Movie & Draper, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff'

3. Statutes O I 8 4
Where there is doubt or uncertainty
concerning interpretation and application
of statutes, they should be viewed in light

Merrill R. Weech and Larry C. Holman,
of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough,
Salt Lake City, for Walker Bank & Trust
Co., amicus curiae.

Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Salt
Lake City, for defendant.
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CROCKETT, Justice:
The plaintiffs, Midland Telephone Company, providing service in Grand County,
and Utah Telephone Company,1 providing
service in Box Elder County, are both subsidiaries of Continental Telephone Corporation, a corporation with nationwide operations. They claimed as deductions on
their Utah tax returns, payments transferred to Continental in connection with
the preparation and payment of consolidated federal tax returns for the tax years
1965 through 1970. The Tax Commission
partially disallowed plaintiffs' claimed deductions for payment of federal income
taxes, by reducing the deductions allowable
for the federal transfer payments to Continental to the proportion that plaintiffs'
federal taxable income bears to the total
amount of federal taxes actually paid by
Continental. Plaintiffs seek reversal of
the Tax Commission's decision and full allowance on their state returns of the
amounts they paid to Continental.

Commission and accounting methods approved by it, including the joining with
other subsidiaries of Continental in filing
its consolidated federal income tax return.
The steps taken in computation, payment,
and intersystem accounting of the consolidated federal income tax by Continental
for each of the years in question are allowable under federal law. Pursuant to a
closing agreement with the Internal Revenue Service, (hereinafter called I.R.S.) the
consolidated federal return of Continental
and its subsidiaries is prepared on a
"separate company'' basis, with Continental acting as an agent for each subsidiary
in dealings with the I.R.S. Continental
files a declaration of estimated taxes, remits quarterly payments, and at the end
of the tax year files the return and pays
any remaining tax, all on a consolidated
basis.

Each of the subsidiaries, including Midland and Utah, computes its declaration of
estimated federal taxes separately at the
Plaintiffs contend that the deductions beginning of the tax year and remits its
taken by them for payment of federal tax- quarterly payments to Continental. At the
es are expressly authorized by Section 59- close of the tax year, the federal taxable
13-7, U.C.A.1953, quoted below; and that income is computed by each subsidiary for
the deduction and allocation made by the
itself as a separate corporation, and each
Tax Commission is not justified either un- subsidiary forwards these figures to Contider Section 59-13-17, U.C.A.1953, or Utah
nental for preparation of the consolidated
Corporation Franchise Tax Regulation 13, return, together with any further payment
upon which the Commission based its ac- that would be due on a separate company
tion.
basis. Remittances of all members of the
Continental Telephone Corporation, the
Continental group are made by actual transparent corporation, is headquartered in
fers of funds and are not merely accountWashington, D. C. It has a large number
ing entries. Continental's preparation of
of operating telephone utilities as subsidi- the consolidated return involves combining
aries as well as some non-utility subsidi- the separately computed net taxable inaries and operates in 42 states and several comes of each subsidiary with the net opforeign countries. The subsidiaries here erating losses of other subsidiaries. Under
involved, Midland and Utah Telephone present federal law, the filing of a consoliCompanies, operate within and derive all dated return permits an economically relattheir income within this State. This i-s so ed group of corporations to report on a bareported on their tax returns in question. sis of transactions entered into with outsidThey are also subject to the regulation and ers, which means, in general, gain or loss
supervision of the Utah Public Service on intercompany transactions between the
I.

A f t e r t''<- t \ .\<\i!'- ii. question. Midland
T - k ' p l •n.L' C.:n;>:.].v i.:en:o<! into U t a h Telep h o n e r ' o i a j . ' . r v ;,M«t the s u r v i v i n g corporation
* (j): the i;;\
i<
' *' •'»1iii r p eH«'i »^f- '*on.-

piny of Utah. For clarity herein the plaintiffs ar« referred to as on the tax returns of
concern in this case.

CONTINENTAL TELEPHONE CO. OF UTAH v. STATE TAX COM'N
Citf as 539 I\2d

related corporations is eliminated from income of the reporting corporation. 2
In the taxable years in issue here, the
net amount due the I.R.S. under Continental's consolidated return was less than the
sum of all the tax payments remitted separately to that company by the profit producing members of the Continental group.
This was because some of the Continental
subsidiaries had operating losses, so that
the consolidated income of the Continental
group totalled less than the incomes reported by the profit making subsidiaries, including these two plaintiffs.
When any current operating loss is utilized, Continental remits funds to that
member, to the extent of the tax effect of
the loss which could have been carried
back to prior years under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, if that member had
filed a separate return with the I.R.S.
The effect of any remaining unused por-

Utah
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tion of net operating loss is offset as to
that member in the future and, thereafter,
Continental remits funds to such member
at the then current tax rate. The result is
that any newly acquired loss incurring subsidiary, while its losses are used to offset
current total group net taxable income,
does not immediately receive a refund
from Continental, but only upon establishing a pattern of profits is a refund then
remitted to such a subsidiary based on its
losses.
In the computation by plaintiffs of their
Utah tax for each of the years in question,
each deducted federal taxes in an amount
computed by multiplying its taxable income, separately computed, by the then
current federal income tax rate, less the (
appropriate amount of Federal investmentcredit earned, 3 and deducted that amount
on its Utah tax return. Upon separate audits by the Tax Commission staff, the following tax deficiencies were assessed:

UTAH T E L E P H O N E COMPANY

Year

Proportionate
Share of Fed.
Tax Liab.

Fed. Tax
Deducted on
Utah Return

$35,415.52
27,205.00
9,777.00
-015,749.00
40,921.00

$57,219.54
48,979.00
8,375.00

21,804.02
21,774.00
(1,402.00)

26,750.00

(14,171.00)

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

Over or (Under Assessed Utah
Deducted)
Tax Deficiency
Difference
(Refund)
$1,308.24
1,306.44
($85.20)
None
369.84
($850.26)

MIDLAND T E L E P H O N E COMPANY
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

46,000.00
44,259.00
45,322.00
26,157.00
24,802.00
-0-

91,250.00
75,572.00
90,491.00
86,288.00
54,573.00
-0-

2. See generally Treas.Reg.Secs. 1.1502-11
through 1.15G4-1 and particularly Treas.Reg.
Sec. 1.1502-13, J. Chommie, The Law of
Federal Income Taxation 292 (2d Ed.1973).
3. Sec. 3S of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 allows taxpayers who make "qualified
investments" (basically depreciable property
539 P 2d—29

45,250.00
31,313.00
45,169.00
60,131.00
29,771.00

2,577.91
1,758.60
2,560.40
3,372.48
1,688.28
-0-

other than buildings and their structural
components) a credit against tax liability.
Section 4G of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 generally provides in the case of public
utility companies for a credit of 4% of the
amount of such investments for the year such
property is placed in service.
Nos. 13842 & 13S43
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In order to arrive at an equitable adjustment of the tax deduction allowable to the
plaintiffs for payment of federal income
taxes, the Commission allowed such deduction on the ratio that the federal taxable
income of each profit producing subsidiary
bears to the total taxable income of all
profit producing subsidiaries.
The Tax Commission is by our constitution endowed with authority to " .
administer and supervise the tax laws of
the State . . . and . . . such
other powers as may be prescribed by the
Legislature;" 4 and this is implemented by
statute, ". . . to perform such further duties as may be imposed upon it by
law, and exercise all powers necessary in
the performance of its duties." 5
In dealing with the computation of net
income in the determination of corporate
franchise taxes, the legislature has provided for several classes of deductions
from gross income, Section 59-13-7, U.C.
A. 1953:
[1,2] In computing net income there
shall be allowed as deductions:
*
*
*
*
*
*
Taxes Paid
(3) Taxes paid or accrued within the
taxable year, except—
(a) Taxes imposed by this chapter;
and,
(b) Taxes assessed against local benefits of a kind tending to increase the
value of the property assessed; provided, that so much of taxes are properly
allocable to maintenance or interest
charges may be deducted.
While the general rule as to taxing statutes is that they are construed strictly
against the taxing authority and favorably
to the taxpayer, the reverse is true as to
provisions allowing deductions.
It is
usually held that deductions are allowed as
4. Art. X I I I , See. 11, Utah Const.
5.
6.

Sec. 59-5-40, U.C.A.1953.
Commissioner v. Sullivan,
S.Ct. 512, 2 L.Ed.2d 559.

356 U.S. 27, 78

a matter of grace and therefore should be
strictly construed. 6 In accordance with
that rule, the taxpayer is required to showthat his claim is fairly and clearly allowable under the terms of the statute. 7
The Tax Commission does not question
that Section 59-13-7(3), U.GA. 1953, just
quoted includes whatever federal taxes are
paid as a proper deduction to plaintiff
corporation. But the dispute here centers
upon what constitutes "taxes paid" for
purposes of qualifying for the deduction.
In an effort to deal with the complexities which arise in the allocation of deductions for various types of corporate structures, the Legislature has provided in Section 59-13-17, U.C.A. 1953:
Allocation of income and deductions
between several corporations controlled
by the same interests.—In any case of
two or more corporations (whether or
not organized or doing business in this
state, and whether or not affiliated)
owned or controlled directly or indirectly
by the same interests, the tax commission is authorized to distribute, apportion
or allocate gross income or deductions
between or among such corporations, if
it determines that such distribution, apportionment or allocation is necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect the income of any of
such corporations.
[Emphasis added.]
The plaintiffs seek to justify their procedure by comparing rulings upon corporate
taxation by the I.R.S. and the federal
courts. They point out that the section
just quoted is essentially the same in wording as Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. They note that the federal
courts in construing Section 482 have interpreted that section to permit only the reallocation of incomes or deductions among
the various members of an affiliated
group and that federal courts have not
7. Interstate
Transit Lines v. Commissioner,
319 U.S. 590, G3 S.Ct. 3279, 87 L.Ed. 1607.

CONTINENTAL TELEPHONE CO. OP UTAH v. STATE TAX COM'N
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Cit<Mis.r>39 P.2d H7

j section 482 to he used to disallow
•••/lions but have relied upon the proviu f Section 269 of the Internal Reve</ode of 1954 when disallowing deduc. . which did not appear to clearly re... the income of affiliated corporations. 8

come at that time. This in effect represents a transfer of credit for current income earned by plaintiffs in Utah to out of
state subsidiaries of Continental. Quite
clearly, since some of the out of state subsidiaries are operating at a deficit, they do
not pay any tax on such transfers, either
in Utah or the states in which they operate,
and hence such income earned in Utah
would completely escape Utah state taxation, if the plaintiffs' position were to
prevail. We agree with the view of the
Tax Commission that our statutes do not
contemplate such a transfer as a deduction
from net state income unless such payments are actually paid to the federal government.

3 4] Where there is doubt or uncer. • :v concerning the interpretation and ap...::,»n of statutes, they should be viewed
;;^ht of the condition and necessities
.••:v-h they are intended to meet and the
v.cts sought to be attained thereby. 9 We
. -rik the broad wording of Section 59-13•~ :::dicates a legislative intent to cover all
::...tions dealing with either direct or in:ri-ct corporate affiliates without regard
-. whether they file individual state or
[6] It is further our opinion that the
. .:>< ilidated state corporate franchise tax
•rtv.rns; and that the language of that sec- fair and reasonable interpretation of the
•:.»:i authorizes the Tax Commission to so term "taxes paid" in Section 59-13-7(3) is
.; portion income and deductions of corpo- that it means a deduction for taxes paid or
'.ittuns within such controlled groups as to accrued which are actually paid or accrue
:.tirly and equitably reflect the income to the taxing entity (I.R.S.); and it does
not mean sums which are merely trans.irned in Utah. 10
ferred to a foreign corporation or foreign
• |5] In the instant case, the key fact is subsidiaries purportedly for that purpose. 11
'".at not all the "federal tax payments" re- In conformity with what we have said
ined to the parent corporation by its herein, it is our conclusion that the apporrentable subsidiaries, and particularly not tionment of the amount of "federal taxes
;
a- amounts remitted by these two plain- paid," according to the formula above re••M'S, reach the federal treasury as tax cited is within the prerogative and duty of
-.tynicnts. A portion of each payment is the Tax Commission and that its decision
Averted by the parent corporation to its should be and is hereby affirmed.
No
arious subsidiaries that are suffering op- costs awarded.
rating losses, allowing such subsidiaries to
-tain current use of their net operating
ELLETT, TUCKETT and MAUGHAN,
»*>es rather than to await profitable years JJ., concur.
"'un such net operating losses could be
•«i'ried forward and deducted from net inHENRIOD, C. J., concurs in the result.
V'nnmissioner v. First Security Bank of
' t"K 405 I \ S . 394, 92 S.Ct. 1085. 31 L.Ed.
-^ ' i l s ; Bittker & Eustiee, Federal Income
Iiv.ition of Corporations and Shareholders,
IM'. 15-21 through 15-30 (3d Ed.1971).
I nited States Smelting, Refining <(• Milling
'"• '\ L'tah Power cG Light Co., 58 Utah 168,
I-»T P . 9 0 2 .

>• Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State
Tax
r
'»«mission, 27 Utah 2d 119, 493 P.2d 632.
) v * note here that Sees. 269 and 482 of the
•nal Revenue Code of 1954 deal with

problems of attempt to evade corporate
taxes on a national scale by acquiring subsidiaries for the principal purpose of taking
advantage of losses. There is no such contention or issue involved here.
II. Accord, see Trunk-Hue Gas Company v.
Collector of Revenue, La.App., 182" So.2d
674. affd., 248 La. 1101, 1S4 So.2d 2 5 ;
contra Cities Service Gas Company v. McDonald, 204 Kan. 705, 466 P.2d 277; but
each decision is highly dependent on the
particular state statutes involved.

CONTINENTAL OIL CO. v. BD. OF REVIEW OF INDUS. COMM. Utah
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Cite as 568 P.2d 727

I would therefore simply reverse the
judgment rendered and award costs to the
appellant.

rw
10

1
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CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah and
Fred L. Forsyth, Defendants.
No. 14699.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 5, 1977.

Unemployment compensation claimant
applied for unemployment benefits after he
was terminated by his employer solely on
basis of his driving record. He was declared ineligible for period of six weeks on
ground he was discharged for misconduct
connected with his work, and he appealed.
The appeals referee affirmed, and he appealed. The Board of Review reversed the
decision of appeals referee, and employer
appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan,
J., held that: (1) Board of Review was not
required to affirm determination of appeals
referee if there was any competent evidence to sustain his findings, and (2) evidence supported Board of Review's finding
that claimant was not discharged for misconduct when he was terminated by his
employer because of two accidents in which
he received citation by investigating officer
for driving under influence of intoxicant
since element of wilfulness, or wantonness,
or equal culpability was not apparent.
Affirmed.

1. Social Security and Public Welfare
e=*571
Two moving traffic violations not discovered until after unemployment compensation claimant had been terminated by his
employer solely on basis of his driving record could not be considered as evidence to
support reason for his termination.
2. Social Security and Public Welfare
e=> 620.25
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission did not act in appellate capacity
and was not required under unemployment
compensation statute to affirm determination of appeals referee if there was any
competent evidence to sustain his findings.
U.C.A.1953, 35-4-1 et seq., 35-4-10(d)(?),
(i).
3. Social Security and Public Welfare
c=>651
Under unemployment compensation
statute, role of Supreme Court was to sustain determination of Board of Review, unless record clearly and persuasively proved
action of Board was arbitrary, capricious
and unreasonable, or specifically, determination was wrong as matter of law because
only opposite conclusion could be drawn
from facts. U.C.A.1953, 35-4-10(i).
4. Statutes <3=*184
When ambiguity exists as to meaning
of statutory term, general purpose and object of legislature in enacting statute
should be ascertained and term should be
construed in accordance with it.
5. Social Security and Public Welfare
<3=>252

Purpose of unemployment compensation statute was to cushion effect of unemployment by payment of benefits to worker
in event of his unemployment. U.C.A.1953,
35-4-1 et seq.
6. Social Security and Public Welfare
c=>620.25

Without finding of culpability, determination of appeals referee that unemployment compensation claimant, who was terminated by his employer because of two
accidents in which he received citation by
investigating officer for driving under in-
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fluence of intoxicant, was discharged for
misconduct connected with his work was
wrong as matter of law. U.C.A.1953, 35-45(b)(1).
7. Social Security and Public Welfare
<s=> 584.5
Evidence supported Board of Review's
finding that unemployment compensation
claimant was not discharged for misconduct
when he was terminated by his employer
because of two accidents in which he received citation by investigating officer for
driving under influence of intoxicant, since
element of wilfulness, or wantonness, or
equal culpability was not apparent; therefore claimant was not ineligible for unemployment benefits for period of six weeks
on ground that he was discharged for misconduct connected with his work. U.C.A.
1953, 35-4-5(b)(l).
John W. Lowe of Brayton, Lowe & Hurley, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Floyd G.
Astin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
defendants.
MAUGHAN, Justice.
Plaintiff, Continental Oil Company, petitioned this court for review of an order of
the Board of Review determining that Fred
L. Forsyth was not ineligible for unemployment compensation. We affirm the decision of the Board of Review. All statutory
references are to U.C.A.1953.
Forsyth was employed by plaintiff as a
district sales representative from June 1968
until February 11,1976, when he wras terminated solely for his driving record. Forsyth
travelled approximately 25,000 miles per
year in the conduct of his employer's business. He was furnished a company automobile for this purpose.
After his discharge, he applied for unemployment benefits. He was declared ineligible for a period of six weeks, on the
ground he was discharged for misconduct
connected with his work, Section 35-45(b)(1). He appealed from this determination, and a hearing was held before an

appeals referee. The referee also found
Forsyth ineligible for benefits for a period
of six weeks. In an appeal to the Board of
Review, the decision of the appeals referee
was reversed, on the ground the evidence
failed to support the finding Forsyth's discharge was for misconduct. Continental
appeals, urging the decision of the appeals
referee should be reinstated.
On February 4, 1976, Forsyth went to a
private club for entertainment purposes
with some of the personnel of Continental.
Included in the group were some of his
supervisors, who were visiting from out of
town. Continental paid his membership
fees for this club and accepted his charges
as items on his expense account. The personnel in the group also drove company
vehicles. Alcoholic beverages were drunk
at this gathering. Forsyth remained at the
club from approximately 4:30 p. m. until
7:00 p. m. He left to get his wife; for they
were to attend a company banquet that
evening.
While driving to his residence Forsyth
was involved in an accident. He testified it
was snowing, and the roads were slippery.
The driver in front of him attempted to
make a right turn into her driveway; she
slipped past the driveway, Forsyth was unable to stop, and collided with her. The
investigating officer arrested Forsyth for
"driving under the influence." His trial on
this charge was held subsequent to the
hearing before the referee, and he was acquitted.
A copy of the investigating officer's report was directed to plaintiff's regional
manager. The report revealed Forsyth was
driving on a restricted license. He had
been involved in a single vehicle collision on
February 3, 1975, at which time he was
charged and subsequently convicted for
"driving under the influence." Forsyth's
license had been revoked, but he had been
issued a restricted license permitting him to
drive in connection with his work and for
emergencies.
Forsyth had not reported this accident to
his employer, but the referee found Cent-
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nental did not promulgate a definite written policy requiring such reports; until
February 27, 1975. Forsyth testified he did
not report the accident, because he had just
previously been awarded the company's
five-year safety award for driving. This
first accident had also occurred after Forsyth had attended a company party, including supervisory personnel. After the company received knowledge of these two accidents, it checked its records and discovered
Forsyth had been involved in a minor accident in August 1975; which was found not
to be his fault. On February 11, 1976, he
was terminated solely on the basis of his
driving record.
[1] At the hearing before the referee,
plaintiff presented evidence indicating Forsyth had been issued two moving traffic
violations, one in 1973, and one in 1974.
However, these citations were not discovered until March 25, 1976, approximately one
and one-half months after Forsyth had
been discharged; therefore, they cannot be
considered as evidence to support the reason for his termination.
The appeals referee found the cause of
Forsyth's dismissal was his driving record;
specifically, the two accidents in which he
received a citation by the investigating officer for driving under the influence of an
intoxicant. The finding was:
. . . Conduct contrary to the best
interests of the employer in the operation
of this vehicle demonstrates an indifference or disregard of the employee's duty
to his employer which constitutes a
breach of his duties and obligations arising out of the contract of employment,
and comprises misconduct in connection
with his work.
Thereafter, the Board of Review considered the record and testimony before the
referee. In the interim Forsyth was acquitted of the driving under the influence
charge. In reversing the referee, the Board
stated they considered the length of claimant's employment, the fact he drove 25,000
miles per year, his prior driving citations,
and his acquittal. The Board found claimant may have used poor judgment in not

reporting his accident in February 1975.
However the company had no well defined
procedure requiring such report until a time
subsequent to that accident. The Board of
Review ruled:
. The company could very well
have had good cause in terminating the
claimant; however, the evidence fails to
support a finding that his discharge was
for misconduct.
[2] Plaintiff contends the Board of Review should be required to affirm the determination of the appeals referee, if there be
any competent evidence to sustain his findings. Plaintiff cites Section 35—4—10(i), and
claims the Board of Review acts in an appellate capacity and should therefore adhere to the standard in the statute that the
findings of fact are conclusive if supported
by the evidence.
The specific provisions of Chapter 4, Title
35, do not sustain plaintiff's argument.
The significant provisions of Section 354-10(i) provide:
In any judicial proceeding
under this section the findings of the
commission and the board of review as to
the facts if supported by evidence shall
be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said
court shall be confined to questions of
law. .
[Emphasis added.]
In contrast, the power of the Board of
Review is set forth in Section 35-4-10(d)(2):
. . .
Upon appeal the board of review may on the basis of the evidence
previously submitted in such case, or
upon the basis of such additional evidence
as it may direct be taken, affirm, modify
or reverse the findings, conclusions and
decision of the appeal referee. .
[3] Under Section 35-4-10(i), the role of
this court is to sustain the determination of
the Board of Review, unless the record
clearly and persuasively proves the action
of the Board was arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable. Specifically, as a matter of
law, the determination was wrong; because
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only the opposite conclusion could be drawn
from the facts.1
Plaintiff contends Forsyth was discharged for misconduct connected with his
work. Chapter 4, Title 35, does not define
the term "misconduct," nor do we have
decisional law which does so howrever, we
are not without aid in reaching our decision.
[4] In Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck,2 the
court wTas confronted with the meaning of
"misconduct" in an unemployment compensation statute. The court observed that
under common usage the term "misconduct" has several meanings which equally
could be within the scope of the statute.
When such an ambiguity exists, the general
purpose and object of the legislature in
enacting the statute should be ascertained
and the term should be construed in accordance with it.
[5] The purpose of the statute was to
cushion the effect of unemployment by the
payment of benefits to a worker in the
event of his unemployment. These payments were to accrue to all covered workers, who were "eligible," under the statute.
However, an employee was not eligible if he
had been discharged for misconduct connected with his work. Thus the benefits
acquired by an employee could be lost in
case of his discharge for misconduct. The
provision, when it is operative, has the effect of a penalty or forfeiture on the employee. In Boynton the court stated:
. If mere mistakes, errors in
judgment or in the exercise of discretion,
minor and but casual or unintentional
carelessness or negligence, and similar
minor peccadilloes must be considered to
be within the term 'misconduct', and no
such element as wantonness, culpability
or wilfulness with wrongful intent or evil
design is to be included as an essential
1. Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, Utah, 567 P.2d 626
(1977).
2.

237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636, 640 (1941).

3.

This definition has been widely adopted or
applied in many jurisdictions. See May-wood
Glass Co. v. Stewart, 170 Cdl App 2d 719, 339

element in order to constitute misconduct
within the intended meaning of the term
as used in the statute, then there will be
defeated, as to many of the great mass of
less capable industrial workers, who are
in the lowrer income brackets and for
whose benefit the act was largely designed, the principal purpose and object
under the act of alleviating the evils of
unemployment by cushioning the shock of
a lay-off, which is apt to be most serious
to such workers.
The court further said a statute for a
forfeiture should be strictly construed, and
an ambiguous or doubtful term should be
given a construction which is least likely to
work a forfeiture. The penal character of
the provision should be minimized by excluding, rather than including, conduct not
clearly intended to be within the provision.
Based on the foregoing principles, it was
the opinion of the court:
. the intended meaning of the
term 'misconduct' . . .
is limited to
conduct evincing such wilful or wanton
disregard of an employer's interests as is
found in deliberate violations or disregard
of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of
such degree or recurrence as to manifest
equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil
design, or to show an intentional and
substantial disregard of the employer's
interest or of the employee's duties and
obligations to his employer. On the other
hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory
conduct, failure in good performance as
the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in
judgment or discretion are not to be
deemed 'misconduct' within the meaning
of the statute.3
P.2d 947 (1959); Gaunce v. Board of Labor
Appeals, Emp. Sec. Div., 164 Mont. 445, 524
P.2d 1108, In re Employees of Edgewater Inn
10 Wash.App. 437, 517 P.2d 973 (1974), Mitchell v. Lovmgton Good Samaritan Center, S**
N.M. 575, 555 P.2d 696 (1976); Employmer.i
Security Commission v. Myers, 17 Anz App
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Also in accord is Jacobs v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board* the AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF
REDDING, PENNSYLVANIA and Larcourt stated that the test of misconduct is
ry Richards Silver, Administrator of the
essentially volitional.
Estate of Lynn Richards Silver, De. The conduct may be harmful
ceased, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
to the employer's interests and justify the
employee's discharge; nevertheless, it
evokes the disqualification for unemploy- EAGLE STAR INSURANCE COMPANY,
ment benefits only if it is wilful, wanton
LTD., Defendant and Appellant.
or equally culpable.5
No. 14800.
[6,7] In the matter before us, the apSupreme Court of Utah.
peals referee did not find Forsyth's conduct
Aug. 8, 1977.
evinced a deliberate, wilful, or wanton disregard of his employer's interest. He found
Plaintiff insurer sought declaratory
conduct contrary to the best interests of the
employer demonstrating indifference or dis- judgment that it had no liability in plane
regard of the employees duty, thus constitu- crash killing four persons because its policy
ting a breach of that duty and comprising covering plane's passengers was secondary
misconduct. The intent of Forsyth was not and policy issued by defendant insurer was
specifically considered by the referee; with- primary. The Third District Court, Salt
out a finding of culpability, the determina- Lake County, Stewart N. Hanson, Sr., J.,
tion of misconduct was wrong as a matter entered summary judgment for plaintiff inof law. The Board of Review characterized surer, and defendant insurer appealed. The
Forsyth's conduct as indicating poor judg- Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that unment, but it construed the evidence as in- der policy excepting coverage of "operating
sufficient to support a finding of miscon- the aircraft under the terms of any agreeduct. The element of wilfulness, or wan- ment which provides any remuneration for
tonness, or equal culpability was not appar- the use of said aircraft", use of aircraft by
president of electrical company which was
ent.
required to pay all expenses of operation
A review of the record reveals the credi- maintenance and storage and its pro rata
ble evidence and reasonable inferences to be share of premiums was so "remunerated"
drawn from it will support opposing find- and, thus, defendant insurer was exempted
ings as to Forsyth's intent. In such a case, from liability in connection with plane crash
the finding of the Board of Review is con- occurring when plane was being flown in
clusive, and its determination is sustained. course of business of electric company.
Vacated.
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.
1. Insurance s=>435.37
Under policy covering airplane's passengers but excepting coverage of "operating Ihfc aira&il vmiteT lbs ierrns of any
agreement which provides any remuneration for the use of said aircraft.", primary
meaning of term "remuneration" would be
to pay an equivalent for, i. e., in the sense
of reimbursing for a service, loss or ex87, 495 P.2d 857 (1972); Barnum v. Williams,
84 Nev. 37, 436 P.2d 219 (1968); Jacobs V.
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals
Board, 25 Cal.App. 1035, 102 Cal.Rptr. 364;
26 A.L.R 3d 1356, Sec. 3, p. 1359.

4. Note 3, supra.
5. At p. 366 of 102 Cal Rptr.

ACQUITTAL
ACQUIRE. To gain by any means, usually by | solve, one from an obligation or a liability; or to
one's own exertions; to get as one's own; to ob- legally certify the innocence of one charged with
crime! Dolloway v. Turrill, 26 Wend.N.Y. 383,
tain by search, endeavor, practice, or purchase;
receive or gain in whatever manner; come to 400.
have. Clarno v. Gamble-Robinson Co., 190 Minn.
ACQUIT A CAUTION. The certificate proving
256, 251 N.W. 26S, 269.
receipt of security that goods shipped from one
In law of c o n t r a c t s and of descents, to become owner of
French port to another shall not be sent to a
p r o p e r t y ; to m a k e property one's own. Crutehficld v.
foreign country. Argles, Fr.Merc.Law, 543.
J o h n s o n & L a t i m e r . 213 Ala. 73. S So.2d 412. To gain
o w n e r s h i p of. 'Commissioner of Insurance v. Broad Street
Mut. C a s u a l t y Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 261, 44 N.E.Cd GS3. 6S4.
Broad m e a n i n g including both purchase and construction;
acquisition being the act of getting or obtaining somet h i n g which niay be already in existence, or m a y be
b r o u g h t into existence through means'employed to acquire
it. R o n n o w v. City of Las Vegas. 57 Nov. 332. 65 P.2d 133,
140. Sometimes used in the sense of * "procure." Jolly v.
McCoy. 3G Cal.App. 479. 172 P. CIS. 619. It does not necessarily m e a n t h a t title has passed. Godwin v. T u t t l e . 70
Or. 424*. 141 P. 1120. 1122. Includes taking by devise. U. S.
v. M e r r i a m . 263 U.S. 179. 44 S.Ct. G9, 70 GS L.Ed. 240, 29
A.L.Pw. 1547.

ACQUIT BACK. In mineral deed, vested in the
grantee the title to such mineral rights as grantor
I had at time of execution of deed, where grantor
had received his title from grantee and the expression was intended to reconvev such title. Allen v. Boykin, 199 Miss. 417, 21 So.2d 74S, 750.
I ACQUITMENT. See Absolution.
ACQUITTAL.

ACQUIRED. To get, procure, secure, acquire.
Jones v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 469. 72 S.W.2d 260,
263.

Contracts
A release, absolution, or discharge from an obligation, liability, or engagement.

Coming to an Intestate in a n y other way than by gift,
devise, or descent from a parent or the ancestor of a parent. In re Miller's Will, 2 Lea (Ter.n.) 51.

According to Lord Coke, there are three kinds of acquittal, n a m e l y : by deed, when the p a r t y releases the obligation; by prescription; by t e n u r e ; Co. Li'tt. 100 a.

ACQUIRED RIGHTS. Thoso which a man does
•not naturally enjoy, but which are owing to his
own procurement, as sovereignty, or the right of
commanding, or the right of property. Borden v.
State, 11 Ark. 519, 527, 44 Am.Dec. 217.
ACQUIRER TAX. German estate inheritance legacy tax, not true inheritance or legacy tax, imposed upon recipient, and not affecting executors.
In re Gotthelf's Will, 273 N.Y.S. 247, 152 Misc. 309.
ACQUISITIOX. The act of becoming the owner
of certain property; the act by wliich one acquires or procures the property in anything. State
ex rel. Fisher v. Sherman, 135 Ohio St. 45S, 21 N.
E.2d 467, 470. Used also of the thine: acquired.
Hartigan v. City of Los Angeles, 170 Cal. 313,
149 P. 590, 592. Taking with, or against, consent.
Scribner v. Wikstrom, 93 N.H. 17, 34 A.2d 658,
660. Especially a material possession obtained by
anv means. Jones v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 469, 7*2
S.\V.2d 260, 263.

Crimes
The legal and formal certification of the innocence of a person who has been charged with
crime; a deliverance or setting free a person
from a charge of guilt.
I
1
]

j
|
I
|

In a n a r r o w sense, it is the absolution of a p a r t y accused
on a trial before a traverse jury. Thomas v. De Graffenreid. 2 N<>u & McC. (S. C> 143. P r o p e r l y speaking,
however, one is not acquitted by the j u r y but by t h e j u d g ment of the court. People v. Rogers. 170 N.Y.S. 86. 87,
102 Misc. 437. And he may be legally acquitted by a j u d g ment rendered otherwise than in pursuance of a verdict,
as where he is discharged by a magistrate because of the
insuiliciency of the evidence, or the indictment is dismissed
by the court or a nol. pros, entered. State v. H a r t , 90 N . J .
Law 261. 101 A. 278. But. compare State v. Smith, 170 N.C.
742: 87 S.E. <AS. 99.
"Nol. p r o s . " not equivalent of " a c q u i t t a l . " Bolton v.
State. 160 Miss. 290. 146 So. 453. 454. The unnecessary discharge of the j u r y without the consent of the accused after
it has been sworn may constitute an acquittal. Riley v.
Commonwealth. 190 Ky. 204. 227 S.W. 146. 147. Acquittal
discharges from guilt, pardon only from p u n i s h m e n t .
Younger v. State. 2 YV.Ya. 579, 9S Am.Dec. 791.
It may occur even though the question of guilt or innocence has never been submitted to a j u r y , as w h e r e a
defendant, having been held under an indictment or informal ion. is discharged because not brought to trial w i t h i n
the time provided by the Criminal Code. State v. Taylor,
130 Kan. 813. 288 P. 731, 732.

Original acquisition
!s t h a t by which a man secures a
p r o p e r t y in a t h i n s wliich Is not at the time he acquires
it. and in its t h e n existing condition, the p r o p e r t y of any
o t h e r individual. It m a y result from occupancy: 2 Kent.
2S0: accession; 2 Kent, 293: intellectual labor—namely, |
for inventions, which are secured by patent r i g h t s ; and
Acquittals
in fact are those which take place w h e n t h e
for the a u t h o r s h i p of books, maps, and charts, which is
j u r y , upon trial, finds a verdict of not guilty.
p r o t e c t e d by c o p y r i g h t s ; 1 Bouv.Inst. 50S. n.
Acquitt'ils
in law are those which take place by m e r e
Derivative
acquisitions
are those which are procured
operation of law; as whore a man has been charged
from others. Goods and chattels may chancre owners by
merely
as
an
assessory. and the principal has been acquitact of law in the cases of forfeiture, succession, m a r r i a g e ,
ted. 2 Co.Inst. 361. Ccmpare State v. Walton, 1S6 N.C.
j u d g m e n t , insolvency, and intestacy; or by act of the
485. 119 S.K. 886, 888.
p a r t i e s , as by gift or sale.
An acquisition niay result from the act of the p a r t y himself, or those who are in his power acting fr-r him. as his
children while m i n o r s ; Gale v. Parrot, 1 N.II. 28. See
Dig. 41. 1. 53; Inst. 2. 9. 3.

See Accession.
ACQUIT. To set free, release or discharge as
from an obligation, burden or accusation. Commonwealth v. Benson, 94 Pa.Super. 10. 15. To ab-

See Jeopardy; Autrefois Acquit; Convict.
Feudal Law
The obligation on the part of a mesne lord to
protect his tenant from any claims, entries or
molestations by lords paramount arising out of
the services due to them by the mesne lord. See
Co.Litt. 100a.

